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ABSTRACT 
This research investigates the current state of foreign direct investment by firms from South Korea.  Korean 
FDI is found to be increasingly diverse in location and purpose; small and medium sized firms are investing 
primarily in Asia in search of cheap labor, while large firms are investing in major markets worldwide to 
secure market share and to acquire and develop technology.  The applicability of Dunning’s eclectic theory 
to Korean FDI is discussed, and theoretical refinements concerning ownership advantages are suggested. 
Implementation challenges involve HRM, and vary according to whether the labor an investment requires 
is commodity-like or skilled.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The nature of foreign direct investment (FDI) has changed dramatically over the past 
three decades. Today, FDI is carried out by a broader range of firms, in greater amounts, 
in different places, and for different reasons than it was in the past.  Increasingly active in 
the FDI arena are companies from developing or newly developed Asian countries.  
Relatively little research has been done on the characteristics of and motivations for these 
countries’ FDI, and how these may differ from the FDI of traditional multinational 
corporations. This new Asian FDI also presents challenges for traditional FDI theory, 
which has been built primarily upon more widely available data on FDI by large Western, 
mainly American, MNCs (Root 1978, 508-509).   
This paper examines these issues through an investigation of foreign direct 
investment by firms from South Korea. Beginning in 1968 with a $6 million forestry 
development project in Indonesia, Korean FDI had grown to a cumulative total of $25.83 
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billion in over 11,000 projects by the end of 2000 (see Exhibit 1), even though the pace 
of increase has been slowed down by the 1997-98 foreign exchange crisis. Carried out by 
firms both large and small, driven by a variety of external and internal forces, and taking 
various forms, Korea’s outward FDI is representative of the current and changing state 
of foreign direct investment. As such, it also offers a valuable perspective on FDI theory 
development and on important implementation issues.  
 
Exhibit 1: Foreign direct investment by South Korea firms, 1968-2000 
Years 
Net Investment Outstanding Investment 
Cases Amount ($ mil) Cases Amount ($ mil) 
1968-80 279 127.0 279 127.0 
1981 36 21.9 315 148.9 
1982 32 97.6 347 246.5 
1983 44 102.6 391 349.1 
1984 33 48.2 424 397.3 
1985 9 63.8 433 461.0 
1986 31 158.3 464 619.3 
1987 59 320.1 523 939.4 
1988 139 156.2 662 1,095.6 
1989 246 392.4 908 1,488.0 
1990 319 812.7 1,227 2,300.7 
1991 421 1,026.9 1,648 3,327.6 
1992 460 1,098.2 2,108 4,425.9 
1993 618 1,016.4 2,726 5,442.3 
1994 1416 2,029.9 4,142 7,472.2 
1995 1214 2,760.7 5,356 10,232.9 
1996 1371 3,595.1 6,727 13,828.0 
1997 1208 2,992.6 7,935 16,820.7 
1998 518 3,441.7 8,453 20,262.4 
1999 959 2,074.3 9,412 22,336.7 
2000 1792 3,493.9 11,204 25,830.6 
Total  11,204 25,830.6 11,204 25,830.6 
 Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea. Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, 2001 
 
FDI by Korean companies was investigated through extensive use of secondary 
materials, and through the researchers’ access to information and interviews with 
managers from a major Korean conglomerate. The research has three basic aims. The first 
is to understand the nature of Korean FDI: What kinds of firms are investing overseas, 
where are they investing, for what reasons, and in what types of operations? The second 
aim is to consider the implications of Korean foreign investment for FDI theory: Does 
Korean FDI call into question any tenets of existing FDI theory, or can it help us refine 
theory to better explain foreign direct investment in the 1990s? The third aim is to 
examine implementation issues: What are these, and how might they be addressed to 
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make FDI more successful for both investor and host country? 
 
A PROFILE OF KOREAN OUTWARD FDI 
 
Geographical Distribution 
Significant Korean FDI is found in all of the world’s major economic regions: Asia, Nor
th America, Latin America, and Europe.  
 
Exhibit 2: Korean FDI by regional in 2000 (outstanding value in millions of dollars) 
Region No of cases Total value Average amount/case 
Asia 7,643 10,670 1.4 
Middle East 45 229 5.1 
North America 2,149 7,744 3.6 
Latin America 366 2,602 7.1 
Europe  539 3,461 6.4 
Africa 93 481 5.2 
Oceania 369 644 1.7 
Total 11,204 25,831 2.3 
  Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea. Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, 2001 
 
In terms of project size, there is significant variation among the regions, with the 
average investment amounting to $1.40 million in Asia, $3.60 million in North America, 
$6.42 million in Europe, and $7.2 million in Latin America in 2000 (The Export-Import 
Bank of Korea 2001). This is indicative of the differing nature of investments across the 
regions. The smaller average investment size for Asia reflects smaller Korean companies’ 
focus on labor-intensive, assembly-oriented investments in Asia, while the larger average 
investment figures for North America, Latin America and Europe reflect larger Korean 
corporations’ more capital-intensive global manufacturing and technology-development 
investments within the EU and NAFTA trade blocs (see below). 
Before the 1997-1998 financial crisis, a trend of increasing Korean investment in Ch
ina and the US, and decreasing investment in Europe was evident, as Exhibit 2 shows (K
orean Herald 1996 (a) March 31) 
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Exhibit 3: Location of Korean FDI: Jan-Feb 1995 vs. Jan-Feb 1996 
 Jan.-Feb. 1995 Jan.-Feb. 1996 
No. of cases Total value No. of cases Total value 
Total Korean FDI  245 $738 million 266 $956.5 
Korean FDI in China 135 $152.7 148 $240.9 
Korean FDI in US 25 $43.1 31 $322.7 
Korean FDI in Europe 20 $323.3 16 $183.6 
Korean FDI in Latin America 6 $16.5 8 $41.2 
Source: Bank of Korea  
 
Particularly striking was growing Korean investment in China before Korea was hard 
hit by the financial crisis in 1997. Korean FDI in China began in 1989, and by 1990 there 
were 52 investment projects worth $68 million. Since then it had increased dramatically, 
facilitated by the establishment of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Beijing in 1992. 
According to the Korean Foreign Trade Association, in 1994 there were almost 2000 
Korean investment projects in China, worth $1.7 billion. This represented 55% of total 
overseas investments, though only 23% of capital.  Low-wage seeking smaller Korean 
companies had been most active in China, as the relatively small average investment size 
of $850,000 indicates. Korea’s larger firms have been slowed by the greater difficulties 
large companies face in negotiating China’s bureaucratic maze and by Chinese demands 
for technology in exchange for access, but are now following the lead of the smaller firms 
and making major investments in China (Paisley and Kiernan 1994). 
 
FDI by Small and Medium Sized Firms 
Korea’s smaller companies began investing in overseas operations in the late 1980s.  
Investments by small and medium sized firms accounted for 78.8% of the cases of 
Korean outward FDI in 1992, 81.8% in 1993 (Paisley and Kiernan 1994), and 64% (just 
24% by value) in 2000 (The Export-Import Bank of Korea 2001).   
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Exhibit 4: Cumulative Foreign Direct Investment by Korean Small- and Medium-sized 
Firms. 
 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total FDI (A)        
Amount  2,301 10,233 13,828 16,821 20,262 22,337 25,831 
Cases 1,227 5,356 6,727 7,935 8,453 9,412 11,204 
Ave. amount/case 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.3 
Small/Med firms (B)        
Amount  405 2,156 2,853 3,314 3,502 3,993 6,111 
Cases 489 3,624 4,442 5,168 5,447 6,021 7,187 
Ave. amount/case 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 
Ratio B/A (%)        
Amount 17.6 21.1 20.6 19.7 17.3 17.9 23.7 
Cases 39.9 67.7 66.0 65.1 64.8 64.0 64.1 
Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea.  Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, 2001 
Note:   Numbers indicate total accumulated net investment by the end of a year; amounts are in millions 
of US$. 
 
The driving force behind small firms’ overseas expansion is the search for cheap labor. 
Korea’s small and medium sized companies differ greatly from the country’s large 
conglomerates, or chaebol.  Unlike the chaebol, which have been the Korean government’s 
chosen engines of economic growth and the beneficiaries of privileged access to capital, 
technology, government contracts, and protection, Korea’s smaller companies are 
relatively underdeveloped and capital-poor. They have been particularly hard hit by the 
steep rise in manufacturing wages in Korea since democratization in the late 1980s.  While 
larger firms have been able to respond to rising labor costs by increasing capital 
intensiveness through automation, small firms in labor-intensive light industries such as 
textiles, toys, and footwear have had little choice but to try to remain competitive by using 
cheaper labor offshore. In textiles, for example, an industry populated by smaller firms, 
Korea’s offshore textile and apparel plants numbered 1,752 in 60 countries at the end of 
2000; 79% of these were in Asia (The Export-Import Bank of Korea 2001). 
 Asia has been and continues to be the preferred destination of FDI by smaller 
Korean firms.  In 2000, 76% of small firms’ foreign investments went to Asia (The 
Export-Import Bank of Korea 2001). 
The smaller companies initially focused on low wage Southeast Asian countries like 
Indonesia and Thailand, more recently moving into Vietnam and China as those countries 
have become more open to foreign investment.  The overriding attraction, as mentioned 
above, is low wages; according to a survey by the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, 
the average monthly wage paid by South Korean companies was $70 in Vietnam, and $74 
in China in 1994.  In 2000, China alone accounted for 3,665 investments by small Korean 
firms worth $1,663 million (The Export-Import Bank of Korea 2001). 
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There were around 100 Korean firms in Vietnam in 1996, mostly small and medium 
sized companies centered around Hanoi (mainly in heavy and chemical industries) and Ho 
Chi Min City (mainly in light industries like footwear, bags, textiles) (Korean Herald 1996 (b) 
March 23). The number has increased to 139 investments, worth $120.6 million by 2000 
(The Export-Import Bank of Korea 2001). 
 
FDI by Korea’s Chaebol  
Korea’s chaebol  (conglomerates) are among the largest companies in Asia. In 1995, the 
overseas presence of the chaebol remained relatively small; only 5% of big four’s (Samsung, 
Hyundai, LG and Daewoo) assets were overseas. (This compared with 28% for Japanese 
electronics firms, which had moved most of their low-end production offshore.) This 
picture was expected to be changing rapidly, as the Korean big four planed to invest a 
total of $20 billion on overseas expansion by the year 2000 (Korean Economic Daily 1995 
April 12). However, some of these plans were not materialized because of the 1997-1998 
financial crisis. In 2000, the outstanding value of FDI (more than $10 million each) by the 
four conglomerates was $10.4 billion. The outstanding value of FDI by SK, currently the 
third largest chaebol in Korea, was $746 million in 2000 (The Export-Import Bank 
October 2001).  
 The overseas expansion of the chaebol is driven by a different set of forces than that 
of Korea’s smaller companies. During the 1980s, chaebol invested abroad primarily for 
defensive reasons.  Manufacturing was set up overseas to lower production costs and to 
defend established market share via local production or indirect exports (from third 
countries). At the same time, vertical foreign investments were made to secure raw 
materials needed for production at home.  In the 1990s, however, FDI has been 
increasingly aimed at capturing opportunities for growth in emerging markets such as 
China and Southeast, at securing market position inside major trading blocs, and at 
obtaining advanced technology and marketing know-how from advanced countries 
through mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliances.  A researcher at the Korea 
Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade explains: “For larger firms, cheap costs are 
no longer the primary motive for going abroad; aggressive scouting for overseas market 
shares and smoother technological absorption are the emerging reasons” (Korean Herald 
1996 (a) March 23). 
 
Market Development Investment      
Ambitious to grow by building and maintaining strong competitive positions in both est
ablished and emerging markets, the chaebol  consider establishing a solid production base 
and market position inside each of the “triad” regions—Europe, North America, and As
ia—to be essential, particularly with the trend toward the formation of economic blocs s
uch as the European Union, NAFTA, and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). 
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For example, Samsung, the largest and most globalized chaebol in Korea, has 
accelerated its plans for Europe in response to European economic unification.  
Beginning with a TV plant in Portugal in 1982—the first overseas production facility to 
be set up by a Korean manufacturer—the Samsung Group has been operating an 
electronic components plant in Portugal, a VCR plant in Spain, and TV plants in the UK, 
Hungary, and Turkey. It also has joint ventures in the Czech Republic and Turkey. In 
1994, Samsung made a number of large scale investments, including a $30 million 
semiconductor assembly plant in Portugal, a $120 million color picture tube factory at 
Berlin, Germany, and a $700 industrial park at Wynyard in the UK, the largest investment 
ever made in Europe by a Korean firm.  In addition, Samsung produces refrigerators in 
Slovakia, watches in Switzerland. It has acquired a majority stake in Rollei, the German 
camera manufacturer (Korea Herald 1996 March 5, Dent and Ranerson 1997).   
Examples of North American market-oriented investments by chaebol include two $
1.3 billion semiconductor plants built by Hyundai in Oregon and Samsung in Texas (Kor
ean Herald 1996 February 28, Korea Herald 1996 March 30), and a $231 million consumer 
electronics complex established by Samsung in Tijuana, Mexico (Korean Herald 1996 (c) 
March 31).  These supply the North American market from within the boundaries of N
AFTA.      
LG Group investment activity in Asia exemplifies the chaebol approach to growth 
opportunities in that region. Indonesia has been the focus of much of LG’s Asian 
investment. LG’s first manufacturing investments in Indonesia were refrigerator and 
color TV plants built in 1990, followed by a household pump factory.  A TV picture tube 
plant in Jakarta (yearly capacity: 2.2 million tubes) started operation in 1996; this facility 
also started producing monitors and TV components in 1998, at a total investment cost 
of $514 million. Lee Si Yong, Head of the Business Planning Department’s Overseas 
Investment Team explained that Indonesia was chosen as the site of these investments “in 
order to avoid collision with Japanese manufacturers which had rushed into Malaysia and 
Thailand in response to yen appreciation” (Sakai 1995).  Indonesia’s size (population: 190 
million) and rising income levels also make for a lucrative domestic market.  LG sales in 
Indonesia have grown rapidly; the company is number two in color TV market share, and 
number three in refrigerators, and is rushing to increase capacity at its existing Indonesian 
TV and refrigerator plants (from 400,000 to 1 million color TVs and from 100,000 to 
200,000 refrigerators). Another important factor is the ASEAN Free Trade Area, which 
will further increase the attractiveness of Indonesia (and other within-ASEAN nations) as 
production bases for export to neighboring countries.  
LG was expanding aggressively into the rest of Asia as well, as part of a policy, 
announced in 1995, to increase the amount of overseas production from 10% to 45% of 
total LG Group production.  Eight new overseas manufacturing plants were scheduled to 
begin operations in 1996, including air conditioner and microwave oven plants in Tianjin, 
China ($99 million invested), and a color TV plant in Vietnam (Sakai 1995).  By the year 
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2005, the LG Group plans to invest an additional $5 billion in new Asian operations, 
including: two lease banks, a housing complex, and an oil refinery in Vietnam; an 
electronics complex, a housing complex, and a resort in Indonesia; a semiconductor plant 
in Penang, Malaysia; and in India a software center in Bangadore and an oil/chemical 
refinery and electronics complex in Delhi.  The location decisions for these investments 
were made at the top: by the LG Chairman’s Office.  LG envisions these not as 
independent operations but as interrelated investments with significant synergistic effects 
for the LG Group.  Most recently, LG Electronics plans to make a $1.5 billion investment 
in Netherlands, which would make the European country the largest beneficiary of 
overseas investment by a Korean firm (Korea Herald 2002 January 22)   
Daewoo’s market development investments are notable for their particular focus on 
emerging markets in developing countries such as China, India, Iran, and the former 
Soviet Bloc countries.  Under its ambitious “Vision 2000” plan, the Daewoo group 
intends to boost its foreign subsidiaries from 42 in 1994 to 330 by the end of the decade 
(Ahn 1994).  In Eastern Europe, the company will have auto plants in operation in the 
Czech Republic, Uzbekistan, Poland, and Romania by 1998; these will not only provide 
cars to the local market, but will serve as sites for exports to neighboring markets as well. 
 Combined with other overseas auto plants in India, China, Indonesia, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Iran, and Peru, these will raise annual overseas capacity to one million units 
(Korean Herald 1996 March 13).  Other major Daewoo investments in developing country 
markets include audio and video plants in Brazil, Poland, and Vietnam, and a $1.5 billion 
car parts factory and $300 million cement works in China’s Shandong province (Nakarmi 
1995).  The company has also won a $5.2 billion contract to build a theme park near 
Beijing (Korean Economic Daily 1995 April 12), and plans to set up a large industrial estate in 
India exclusively for smaller enterprises (Korean Herald 1996 (b) March 31). 
In connection with their market development-oriented investments in overseas 
production facilities, the chaebol are also setting up supply and marketing support 
operations abroad.  Samsung, for example, opened a purchasing office in Shanghai in 
1996 to secure raw materials and parts for production at its Chinese camera plant; a 
company spokesman commented: “We’re looking at an upwards of 30% reduction in 
production costs by buying from the Chinese market” (Korean Herald 1996 April 21).  On 
the marketing side, Daewoo was investing $500 million in 40 exhibition centers, 15 new 
branches and sales companies, and 100-odd after-sales service centers for its products in 
Russia (Korean Herald 1996 February 18). 
 
Technology-seeking Investments  
In addition to FDI for overseas market development, the chaebol are investing heavily in 
technology acquisition and development operations abroad, mainly in Europe and the 
United States.  Upgrading of technological capabilites is imperative for the chaebol as they, 
and Korea as a whole, strive to move up the ladder of comparative advantage.  With 
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Korean labor costs the second highest in Asia after Japan in 1994, the challenge for chaebol 
is to move away from a reliance on selling mass-produced, low-level goods, which 
developing nations can now produce and sell more competitively, toward strength in high 
value-added products in high-tech industries (Rappleye 1994).  Chaebol investments for 
this purpose take two basic forms: (1) the setting up of research laboratories overseas, and 
(2) acquisitions of and joint ventures with foreign companies that possess valuable 
technology and/or innovative capabilities.   
By end of 1992, the big four chaebol had set up 17 overseas research centers in 
electronics alone: nine in the US, five in Japan, and three in Europe.  More recent R&D 
investments include an automotive R&D center opened by Hyundai near Detroit, and a 
personal computer research center in Taiwan and a design research institute in Ireland set 
up by LG.  At the latter, LG conducted joint design projects with one of the world’s 
leading design institutes, Britain’s Royal College of Art (The Economist 1994 November 5, 
Korean Herald 1996 February 22, Korean Herald 1996 February 9). 
Technology-seeking mergers and acquisitions by Korean chaebol are taking place m
ainly in North America and Europe. Hwang Young-kye, managing director and treasure
r of Samsung Electronics, states: “In the US and Europe there are two reasons for acqui
ring existing companies: technology and market” (Business Korea 1995 February 1).  Sams
ung in 1995 paid $378 million for AST, one the America’s largest personal computer ma
kers (Korean Economic Daily 1996 April 12).  In 1994, Hyundai bought a semiconductor di
vision of AT&T (for $340 million) and a 40% stake in Maxtor Corporation of the US (f
or $165 million), which had 12% of the world hard-disk drive market; the Maxtor invest
ment, besides guaranteeing exports of Hyundai’s computer memory chips, involved cros
s-licensing of the two companies’ technologies and shared development of hard-disk dri
ve parts and components (Paisley and Kiernan 1994). In 1995, LG Electronics paid $35
1 million to acquire US TV maker Zenith.  In addition to increasing LG’s share of the U
S television market from 2% to 12%, this investment gave LG access to key Zenith tech
nology in the areas of high definition television—HDTV signal transmission technology
 developed by Zenith has been adopted as the HDTV standard in the US—and interacti
ve cable TV signal transmission devices (Glain 1995). 
Capital investment in smaller technology developing companies in places like 
California’s Silicon Valley is another method Korean chaebol are employing to develop and 
access leading-edge technology. 
 
Natural Resource Access FDI 
Another type of FDI being carried out by larger Korean companies is investment for the 
purpose of gaining access to key natural resources.  South Korea is a relatively small and 
natural resource-poor nation; at the end of the Second World War, the South was 
primarily agricultural while the North (today’s North Korea) possessed most of the 
natural resources and heavy industry established by the Japanese during their 35-year 
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occupation of the Korean peninsula (Il 1993, 2).  This, coupled with the devastation 
caused by the Korean War, has forced South Korea (not unlike Japan in the early post-war 
period) to look outside its borders for the capital, technology, and natural resources 
needed for economic development.  The history of Korean outward FDI therefore 
includes numerous investments aimed at securing natural resource access.  One example 
is a London-based joint venture between two Korean firms, Petroleum Development 
Corporation (PEDCO) and Hanwha Energy Company, which  acquired a 15% stake in a 
Texaco oil exploration project in the North Sea; the project was expected to  yield 60,000 
barrels of crude oil a day beginning in 1996, and includes additional exploration in the area 
expected to result in oil output over a 22-year period (Korean Herald 1996 March 12).  
Another case is a 34-year, $474 million investment by Hansol Paper Company (a company 
spun off from Samsung in 1993) in a forestry project in New Zealand, which will ship 
lumber to Korea beginning in 2023; a similar project in Australia by the same company 
will begin lumber shipments 2003 (Korean Herald 1996 February 17). Closer to home, 
abundant natural resources available in North Korea, China, and Russia have been and 
will continue to be targets for resource-seeking FDI from South Korea (Il, 1993, 160).  
For example,  the Korean government has recently announced that it will map out a 
comprehensive strategy to secure a stable supply of energy from the Northeast Asian 
region, including a plan to complete the introduction of  natural gas into Korea from a gas 
field in the eastern Siberian Irkutsk between 2008 and 2010 (Korea Herald 2000 (b) January 
22). 
 
Korea’s Shifting FDI Picture  
Apart from its variety, and from the question of its fit with traditional FDI theory, one o
f the most striking feature of Korean outward FDI is the degree to which it has changed
and continues to change in response to trends in the international business environment
and to the economic development and shifting comparative advantages of Korea as a na
tion. 
External trends which have influenced Korean FDI decisions include: 
 
(1) Shifting trade barriers.  The global trend toward free-market economic policies h
as reduced restrictions on FDI and facilitated the building of overseas export platforms i
n favorable locations by easing restrictions on cross-border shipments of inputs and fini
shed products.  At the same time, the development of trade blocs is pressuring MNCs t
o establish more self-sufficient production systems within bloc boundaries. 
(2) A maturing domestic market. The home market for many of the products Korean 
firms make is at or near saturation point, causing companies to increasing look to overseas 
markets for growth opportunities. 
(3) Deregulation at home.  In 1993, administrative restrictions on the number of Ko
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rean firms from one industrial sector that could invest in a particular foreign country we
re eased, causing a sharp jump in FDI (Paisley and Kiernan 1994). In addition, the Kore
an government has promised its trading partners that it will open up the domestic marke
t, cutting red tape for investors and easing restrictions on imported goods (McGrath and
 Ahn 1994). 
(4) International politics.  Closer economic ties with China, including FDI in that co
untry, is politically advantageous for South Korea as China is the only country with any l
everage over unpredictable North Korea. 
(5) Changing competitors. Squeezed at the lower end by growing competition from 
the next wave of newly industrializing countries such as Thailand and Malaysia, and faced 
with the loss of protection and government patronage at home, Korean firms are 
increasingly having to compete not only with each other but against major Japanese and 
Western corporations.  The gaps chaebol face vis-a-vis these competitors in reputation and 
market position—Korean producers have a reputation outside Asia for variable quality, 
much of their revenues come from low margin, down-market items, and a high 
percentage of their exports are OEM—as well as in technology, are driving to a large 
extent both their market- and technology-seeking FDI. 
  
Laid across these external changes is the continuing evolution of the Korean econo
my from a low wage economy producing shoes, textiles, small TVs, and cheap cars to o
ne trying to become one of world’s leading producers of high-tech goods.  With expandi
ng exports and growing economic prosperity in the 1980s, organized labor demanded an
d won wage increases between 1986 and 1992 that surpassed gains in productivity, result
ing in a shift in Korea’s comparative advantage as a nation; Korea has lost its edge in the
 export of labor-intensive goods to developed markets, and now must make the difficult
 transition to technology-intensive industries.  As the data reported in this paper show, 
much of Korean outward FDI is connected with making this transition. 
The shifting profile of Korean FDI and the changing external circumstances which 
underlie it fit comfortably within the framework of FDI theory discussed above; all 
involve changing internalization, ownership, and location advantages. These changes 
serve as a reminder, however, that FDI is not static.  FDI patterns and the forces 
underlying them are constantly evolving, and at a faster rate today than they did in the 
more stable economic environment of earlier decades. This dynamic aspect of FDI 
deserves continued study.     
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF KOREAN FDI 
The sheer variety of Korea’s outward FDI, one of its most striking features and a 
reflection of the growth and diversification of the Korean economy, poses difficulties for 
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any single theory which strives to explain all or most cases of foreign direct investment.  
On the other hand, Korean FDI offers a valuable opportunity to update and refine FDI 
theory to better fit today’s foreign investment realities.  In the sense that Korea’s FDI 
diversity is representative of the diversity that characterizes FDI in general in the 1990s, it 
provides a useful case study for refining theory to better explain and predict FDI as it is 
today.  In this section, we look at four distinct types of Korean FDI from a theoretical 
perspective: (1) manufacturing investments, (2) supply and market support investments, 
(3) natural resource access investments, and (4) technology acquisition and development 
investments.  For each, we consider how well Korean investments are explained by 
existing theory, and suggest how theory might be modified to enhance its explanatory 
power.  We also consider how a dynamically changing external environment and Korea’s 
economic development have changed and continue to change the profile and nature of 
Korean firms’ foreign investments.    
 
Manufacturing FDI 
Traditional FDI theory has focused most heavily on overseas production investments by 
MNCs, and has sought to explain (1) why firms go abroad as direct investors, (2) how 
these firms can compete successfully in foreign markets given the disadvantages they face 
as vis-a-vis local companies operating in a familiar business environment, and (3) why 
firms choose to enter foreign countries as producers rather than as exporters or licensors 
(Root 1978, 518).  Work in this area has culminated in Dunning’s unified “eclectic theory” 
of FDI (Dunning 2000), which holds that three conditions are necessary for production 
FDI to occur.  First, the firm must have some unique “ownership advantage,” such as a 
well-known brand name, superior technology, or scale economies, which allows it to 
overcome the disadvantages of competing with foreign firms in their home countries 
(Hymer 1976).  Second, there must exist an “internalization advantage” which makes 
internalizing international production (producing in the foreign market) more 
advantageous that exporting products or licensing technology or a brand name.  Such is 
the case when the transaction costs of using a market, i.e., the costs associated with 
negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a contract, are high (Williamson 1983).  Third, 
there must be a “location advantage,” some factor that makes undertaking the business 
activity in a foreign location more profitable than doing it domestically. 
Location and internalization advantages clearly underlie much of the manufacturing 
FDI carried out by Korean firms.  Important location advantages include low labor costs, 
reduced tariffs inside trade blocs, and geographic closeness to overseas markets.  
Proximity to previous investments by the same firm in the same region can also be 
considered a location advantage.  This works in two ways.  First, when buyer-supplier and 
synergistic relationships exist among subsidiaries in a region, these can be conducted at 
low transport cost and with fewer of the other difficulties that come with coordination 
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over long distances.  Second, through its initial investments in a foreign country, a firm 
gains country-specific operating knowhow and builds useful business and political 
relationships; subsequent operations set up in that country by the same firm can gain 
access, thanks to their corporate connection to the prior investments, to that knowhow 
and those relationships, thus reducing the disadvantages inherent in operating in an 
unfamiliar environment.  These proximity advantages help explain the grouping pattern 
seen, for example, in the LG Group’s Asian investments. 
Internalization advantages are present when trade barriers (which can block or 
increase the costs of exporting) exist, and when difficulties inherent in packaging for sale 
and transferring “intangible” competencies such as management skills rule out their sale 
through markets. 
The one element of Dunning’s eclectic theory that does not match well with Korea’s 
overseas manufacturing FDI is the ownership advantage, particularly the idea that an 
ownership advantage is necessary to compete successfully against foreign firms on their 
home turf.  In fact, host country firms are irrelevant, or non-existant, in many of the 
foreign production investments made by Korean companies.  For low wage-seeking FDI, 
the relevant product markets and competition often lie outside the host country.  Firms 
setting up production in cheap-labor locations are in many cases not selling locally, but 
exporting to third countries or back home.  This is particularly true of FDI in the special 
economic zones which many developing countries have set up.  For example, Korean 
textile companies have a strong presence in export processing zones in Sri Lanka and 
Guatemala, via which they can circumvent quotas on exports to Western markets under 
the multifiber agreement (Korean Economic Daily 1995 April 12).  Likewise, the competition 
for Korean firms building overseas production facilities is often not indigenous firms but 
other Korean firms or MNCs from other developed or developing economies.  This point 
applies, of course, not just to Korean FDI, but to FDI in export platforms by other 
nations’ MNCs as well. Theoretically, this issue can be partially handled by differentiating 
between domestic market-oriented and export-oriented FDI. While an ownership 
advantage over domestic firms, if they exist, may be necessary to explain the former, it is 
not a necessary condition for the latter.  Indeed, a United Nations study has found 
significant differences between the host country features that attract domestic 
market-oriented FDI and those that attract export-oriented FDI: firms investing to sell in 
the domestic market were concerned with protection from domestic and international 
competition and with basic market conditions, while firms investing to export were 
influenced more by factor-based incentives such as labor costs (Lall 1995). 
Even in the case of domestic-market oriented FDI, however, including investments 
to produce for the broader “domestic market” of a trade bloc, a firm’s main competition 
is likely to come not from local companies but from global ones. This underscores a gap 
between traditional FDI theory and today’s FDI practice that the globalization of the 
world economy has created.  In a world in which high trade barriers produced isolated and 
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protected country markets, and indigenous firms enjoyed strong competitive positions 
bolstered by clear home market familiarity advantages over potential foreign entrants, the 
“ownership advantage” element of Dunning’s theory was a necessary condition for FDI. 
 Today, however, decades of steady trade liberalization have produced a world in which 
goods and components travel much more freely across borders, and both markets and 
competition are increasingly global. Ownership advantages are still, of course, essential for 
success, but they differ little from the non-FDI-specific concepts of “competitive 
advantage” or “distinctive competency”; they have less to do with overcoming 
disadvantages vis-a-vis home country firms in local market familiarity, and more to do 
with providing an edge in competition with from firms from anywhere, in markets all over 
the world.  
 
Supply and Market Support FDI  
Supply and market support FDI, such as Samsung’s Shanghai purchasing office and 
Daewoo’s sales companies and exhibition and after-sales service centers in Russia, have 
received less theoretical attention than production FDI. These FDI types are clearly tied 
to overseas production and sales activities, and can be treated as ancillary investments 
positioned upstream and downstream from foreign production (or from domestic 
production in the case of foreign marketing channel investment to support exports).   
For efficiency reasons (e.g., input availability, lower transport cost) and political 
reasons (e.g., trade barrier avoidance, host country demands for increased local content), 
firms manufacturing abroad are under pressure to procure inputs locally.  Overseas 
purchasing offices facilitate this by helping build a base of low-cost, high-quality supply 
sources.  Some overseas R&D departments of Japanese firms similarly contribute to local 
procurement by serving as testing centers for local components (Craig 1995).  Overseas 
investments in marketing channels and after-sales service centers also follow (or lead) 
products to foreign markets, whether those products are exported to the host country or 
produced there.  Because of their relation to foreign manufacturing and sales, these 
support investments need no special theoretical treatment apart from understanding the 
role they play in promoting more efficient production (through better local inputs) and 
more effective sales (through enhanced marketing support).  In this sense, they are well 
explained by Porter’s concept of the firm as a value chain of value-creation activities 
(Porter 1985, 36-52); like other activities in the chain, materials management and 
marketing are areas of opportunity for increasing competitiveness by adding value or 
reducing the costs of value creation.  The reasons these are foreign investments is simply 
that the production and sales they support occur abroad.  In terms of Dunning’s eclectic 
theory, this can be considered a location advantage, with the qualification that the primary 
advantage of the location is proximity to the firm’s overseas production and sales activities, 
as opposed to locating due to some special feature of the host country per se. 
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Natural Resource Access FDI  
Korean foreign investments aimed at gaining access to natural resources, such as the oil 
and forestry projects mentioned above, can be explained by a combination of necessity (as 
noted above, South Korea is poor in natural resources) and the advantages of control. 
Among the latter are avoidance of the uncertainty associated with relying on purchases of 
key resources from foreign producers who are likely to be oligopolists, and the 
opportunity to build barriers that prevent the entry of new firms into the industry.  There 
may also be technical efficiency advantages generated by the internalization of sequential 
production stages as compared with the coordination of independent producers through 
a price system. This is consistent with established vertical foreign investment theory as 
presented, for example, by Root (1978, 128-129). 
 
Technology Acquisition and Development FDI 
The type of Korean FDI that presents the greatest challenge for existing theory is that 
aimed at acquiring and developing technology. As noted at the beginning of this paper, 
traditional FDI theory has been based largely on data on foreign investments made earlier 
in this century by large, successful US multinationals. Because these MNCs typically 
possessed strong competitive advantages in size, brand name, technology, and so on, the 
main theoretical focus was on the question of why they chose to employ their advantages 
as overseas producers instead of as exporters or licensors. In other words, possession of 
strong competitive (or ownership) advantage was assumed, and the choice of mode for 
applying that advantage abroad was the issue.   
The Korean chaebol that are making technology acquisition and development 
investments in the 1990s are quite different from those US MNCs. Though they clearly 
have strong competitive advantages—this is why they too have grown large and 
successful—they do not possess the technology nor the innovative capabilities that their 
large Japanese and Western rivals possess,  which they desperately need if they are to make 
up for the loss of their labor cost advantage by moving successfully into higher 
valued-added and higher-tech fields. Thus theory that explains Korean 
technology-seeking foreign investment must focus not on how to apply an ownership 
advantage in a foreign country, but how to gain one. Moon and Roehl (2001) argued that 
such unconventional FDI from less developed countries like Korea was driven by the 
concept of imbalance, where as conventional FDI was driven by advantage.  
As with production FDI theory, a central question that must be answered is: Why not 
use markets?  Korean firms have in fact relied heavily on markets, buying technology 
through licensing agreements with Japanese and Western companies. They have only 
been able to gain older technologies in this way, however; MNCs possessing more 
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advanced and leading-edge technologies are generally unwilling to license these, especially 
to potential competitors such as Korean chaebol. This situation, an extreme form of the 
high transaction costs that are generally associated with the sale of technology, can make 
internalization, through buying the company that possesses the advanced technology, the 
best option for technology-hungry chaebol. This option, along with strategic alliances to 
jointly develop technology, is feasible for Korean companies today because they 
increasingly have something to offer companies possessing high-level technology: 
production expertise, supplies of DRAM chips and display screens, Korean-developed 
technology in some niches, and plenty of money (Holstein and Nakarmi 1995). 
The other means that chaebol are using to acquire technology, in addition to buying or 
creating strategic alliances with technology-rich firms, is to set up overseas research 
laboratories. A question that these investments pose is: Why have these research facilities 
been established abroad, instead of at home?  There are several reasons: to be close to 
overseas customers to design products which match local needs; to employ skilled 
scientists and engineers, which are in short supply in Korea; to keep abreast of overseas 
technological developments and benefit from the innovative atmosphere of research 
locations such as Silicon Valley; to respond to host country pressures to perform more 
value-added activities locally, and to perform technical evaluation of locally available parts 
and components. These are consistent with findings concerning the reasons other 
countries’ firms have set up R&D laboratories overseas (e.g., see Serapio 1993). In terms 
of theory, these investments can be explained by a combination of location advantages 
(including nearness to foreign production and marketing activities) and value chain 
considerations.   
 
FDI IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES FOR KOREAN COMPANIES 
Foreign direct investment is not merely an international transfer of capital; it is an extens
ion of a firm from its home country into a foreign host country.  Successful implementatio
n of FDI thus requires that friction or mismatches between firm and host nation charact
eristics and resources, primarily human resources, be minimized, so that the objectives of 
both sides can be achieved.  This requires adjustment and learning on the part of both fi
rm and host, but more so on the part of the firm, for firms can be more flexible, at least 
in the short run, than nations or peoples.   
Of the implementation issues that arise in the case of Korean firms’ outward FDI, 
some are a function of the investment-receiving country. In China, for example, Korean 
companies, like other foreign firms, have experienced difficulties with legal uncertainties, 
power shortages, and labor unrest (Korean Economic Daily 1995 April 12). In the United 
States, laws and attitudes concerning equal opportunity and sexual harassment differ from 
those found at home, and must be studied, understood, and adjusted to by Korean and 
other foreign investors. 
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Other implementation issues are a function of FDI type. In the case of Korean direct 
investments aimed at reducing production costs by using cheap overseas labor, successful 
implementation means managing that labor to obtain maximum work for minimum cost. 
 Pushing overseas workers too hard, on the other hand, can be counterproductive. Small 
Korean companies operating in Asia have given Korean investors a bad name by trying to 
squeeze as much “comparative advantage” as they can out of low wage laborers in 
Indonesia, China, and Vietnam (Paisley and Kiernan 1994). The temptation and 
opportunity to do this is understandable, given that unskilled, job-hungry labor is an 
abundant commodity in these countries. Over-exploitation of that labor, however, as is 
the case with over-exploiting any resource, can lower its value. As a result of poor 
treatment of workers by some companies, Korean companies have become the first 
targets of labor agitation in these countries.  A key for successful cheap labor-seeking FDI 
is therefore to balance expectations of hard work with fair worker treatment, thus gaining 
the value of low-wage labor without risking its loss via worker unrest.  It would also 
benefit Korean firms to work together toward this end, for the exploitative behavior of 
some Korean firms can tarnish the reputation of all, and deny them favorable reputation 
benefits and access to human and other resources available in a host country. 
Another issue related to low wage-seeking FDI is the fact that wages rise, and today’s 
cheap-labor country is likely to be a higher labor cost country tomorrow.  This presents 
a difficult dilemma for investing firms, particularly when setting up foreign production is 
costly: Should they continue to relocate to cheaper-wage countries as labor costs rise 
where they have previously invested, or is there a better approach? One option, best 
suited for non-complex production operations, is contract manufacturing instead of FDI; 
Nike, for example, produces most of its athletic shoes through contract manufacturing in 
Asia, moving relatively easily from location to location in search of low labor costs.  A 
contrasting option, one better suited to firms whose products and manufacturing 
processes are more complex, is to sink deeper roots in a country as local wages rise, 
investing in more capital-intensive technologies rather than relocating. This is what 
Matsushita Electric has done in Malaysia, for example, as labor costs in that country have 
climbed with economic growth (see Craig 1995). This second strategy is welcomed by 
many host countries, which are actively trying to attract export-oriented FDI by offering 
not just low wages but also literacy, discipline, physical infrastructure, and a stock of local 
technical and managerial talent, and are also continually upgrading these to stay 
competitive with other investment-seeking countries (Lall 1995). The point raised above 
concerning worker exploitation is relevant here; if poor labor relations and unfavorable 
reputation develop as a result of poor worker treatment, these can hinder the building and 
effective operation of more complex, higher value-added activities carried out in the same 
country in the future. 
A different set of implementation challenges is connected with Korean firms’ market- 
and technology-oriented FDI, especially in North America and Europe. A critical 
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difference is the type of human resources required for success. In contrast to cheap 
labor-seeking investments, in which the sought human resources are an abundant 
commodity, market- and technology-oriented FDI requires more skilled and scarce 
human resources such as experienced marketers, top scientists and engineers, and capable 
general managers. In order for these kinds of investments to produce desired results, 
Korean companies must overcome weaknesses they have in recruiting and managing 
skilled foreign human resources.   
The employment systems that Korean companies have traditionally used at home rely 
on internal labor markets and seniority-based promotion and reward.  In order to recruit 
and keep skilled foreign specialists and managers, however, Korean firms are finding that 
they must develop employment systems that are radically different.  They must actively 
recruit the best people available from outside the company, regardless of their nationality. 
In the case of critical experts, such as non-Koreans with proven abilities as general 
managers of international operations, this means offering competitive and attractive 
compensation packages. People must also be rewarded and promoted more on the basis 
of performance, and in an organizational climate in which innovation and achievement 
are recognized regardless of age or title. These represent a sharp break from the traditional 
Korean organizational culture with its emphasis on harmony and hierarchy. Not to make 
such adjustments, however, is to risk losing the very benefits sought by much Korean 
FDI. Concerning LG’s acquisition of Zenith, Stephen Marvin, former head of research at 
Ssangyong Investment and Securities Ltd., said: “The Zenith deal has great potential for 
a clash because of Korea’s autocratic style.  If LG tries to run the company their way, there 
could be an exodus of junior managers from Zenith” (Glain 1995). 
The so-called “glass ceiling”, real or perceived limitations faced by non-home country 
nationals in promotion opportunities and decision-making authority, is also an issue that 
Korean companies will need to face.  Japanese firms operating abroad have experienced 
difficulties in attracting and keeping top foreign managers because of this problem, and 
this could obstruct Korean companies as well, due to the Japan-like importance of 
language (the ability to speak Korean) and within-company connections in gaining and 
exercising influence in Korean companies.  In order to avoid this problem, Korean firms 
are trying to eliminate the distinction between home- and foreign-country employees by 
developing equal compensation and promotion plans for both locals and expatriates, and 
by rotating foreign managers between local operations and headquarters in Seoul.  
HRM adjustments are needed not only for the foreign employees of Korean 
subsidiaries, but also for Koreans managing abroad.  Strong international management 
skills are not found in abundance in Korean firms, even in the large and relatively 
experienced chaebol, and these can only be developed if more Korean managers are posted 
abroad for longer periods of time, and if incentive and training systems are put in place 
which evaluate and reward managers based not on seniority but on their effectiveness as 
international managers, and which promote the development of international 
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management assets such as knowledge of local legal systems and business customs, 
understanding of the thinking and behavior of foreign employees and customers, a global 
perspective, a global information network, and solid communication ability.  In the words 
of Samsung Group Chairman Lee Kun-hee, Korean managers must increasingly “be 
armed with innovation, information, intelligence, and international sense to become 
managers most suitable for the coming global village” (Korean Herald 1996 April 7).  
Achieving this will be a continuing challenge for Korean companies as they continue to 
expand abroad, and a key to the successful operation of their overseas investments. 
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